The rush of interest in the constitution arose in part out of a concern with the development of representative and responsible government in the colonies. 2 Todd's family had emigrated to Canada when he was eight, and Hearn had moved to Australia in 1854 to take up a
Professorship at the University of Melbourne. Nonetheless, the main source of concern with the constitution was, of course, the debates around the Reform Act of 1867. During the nineteenth century, from early fears of Jacobinism to the later rise of socialism and the New Unionism, the British state constantly faced the threat and reality of popular protests demanding an extension of political and social rights. These protests were met by a series of Reform Acts, such as that of 1867, which slowly extended the franchise to an ever-larger proportion of adult males. Yet, the Reform Acts, precisely because they extended the franchise, contributed to a widespread anxiety about the entry of the lower classes into government. Even radical liberals were affected by this anxiety, with, for example, J. S. Mill advocating a system of plural voting as a means to preserve the competence of the electorate. 3 One component of the anxiety was the idea that the extension of the franchise would disrupt social stability and constitutional principles. Dicey examined the constitution to dispel this idea. The Westminster Model was to some extent an interpretation of constitutional history developed by conservative Whigs in response to anxieties about popular participation.
Dicey on the constitution
Dicey himself tried to alleviate fears over the spread of democracy by appealing to a constitution within which popular participation was restrained by parliamentary sovereignty, the 6 rule of law, and informal constitutional conventions. In doing so, he provided the classic account of the place of the judiciary within what was to become the Westminster Model.
(i) Parliamentary sovereignty
Dicey begins his analysis of the British legal system by looking at Parliament. He writes, "the sovereignty of Parliament is (from a legal point of view) the dominant characteristic of our political institutions." 4 Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament (composed of the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons) can make or unmake any law it chooses and no other person or institution can overrule its laws. 5 Parliament is the only body with the authority to make laws. Hence parliamentary sovereignty implies the subordination of the judiciary. The judiciary cannot challenge an Act of Parliament.
This attempt to subordinate the judiciary might appear to fail in light of the common law.
The common law appears to allow judges to make laws by establishing precedents that are then binding upon their successors. Dicey argues, however, that the practice of the common law does not really contradict the supremacy of Parliament since "judicial legislation is . . . subordinate legislation" to Acts of Parliament. 6 Crucially, for Dicey, there is nothing in the constitution akin to the judicial review provided by the Supreme Court in the US. To the contrary, Parliament ultimately has supreme authority in every jurisdiction, including the rights of the individual.
At this point parliamentary sovereignty begins to resemble just that kind of despotism which so enraged many eighteenth and nineteenth century radicals. Parliament appears to be a leviathan against which individuals have no appeal and from which they can expect no redress.
Dicey argues, however, that two limitations circumscribe the actions of even the most despotic ruler. First, no prudent monarch or government would knowingly pursue a morally repugnant 7 law that may incite the people to revolt. Secondly, even tyrants who may possess the power to make unilateral decisions are unlikely to take certain actions given the cultural context in which they govern.
(ii) Rule of law
If parliamentary sovereignty appears as a counter to popular participation, the rule of law is, for Dicey, something of a counter to parliamentary despotism. Legislators in parliament are constrained by a commitment to the rule of law. Dicey identifies the rule of law, rather narrowly, with known rules, equality, and respect for precedent. For a start, Dicey argues that government operates in accord with known rules rather than arbitrary caprice or even discretion. Dicey also argues that Britain, unlike its counterparts, has long boasted a notion of equality before the law, according to which all individuals are treated similarly regardless of class or rank. Finally, Dicey associates the rule of law with the way in which the principles that protect individual liberties have become entrenched over time through the decisions of judges. In his view, although some other states rely on enumerated powers and formalised rights, Britain's use of precedent is in fact a more effective way of ensuring individual liberties.
It is difficult to see how Dicey's account of the rule of law can be reconciled with his principle of parliamentary sovereignty. To mention just one issue: if Parliament is bound to follow known rules rather than make and unmake laws on a whim, how can it be free to do as it pleases? Dicey himself argued that far from being in conflict, the two ideas actually reinforced one another: "the sovereignty of Parliament . . . favours the supremacy of the law, whilst the predominance of rigid legality throughout our institutions evokes the exercise, and thus increases the authority, The unwritten constitution of Britain is one in which these conventions and implicit rules are vital to the operation of democracy. Indeed, Dicey elevates the customs and conventions into a "constitutional morality" to which he then appeals to limit the powers of a popularly elected parliament. 9 A sovereign parliament that adheres to these constitutional precepts will not oppose the supremacy of law and so the individual liberties secured by precedent.
After Dicey
Dicey's constitutional views proved extremely influential among both academics and political actors. Even if Bagehot loomed as large over the imagination of political scientists interested in government, Dicey clearly defined the agenda for legal scholars and others interested in the constitution and the judiciary. 10 Indeed, for most of the twentieth century the New domestic worlds, including contracting-out and regimes of regulation, challenged his concept of the rule of law.
Juridification and Governance
The new theories and worlds of governance have decisively undermined the Westminster Model. A process of juridification has undermined Dicey's account of the role of judges and the courts in British government. New Labour's reforms are simultaneously an extension of this process of juridification and a response to problems associated with it. Yet, before we turn to New Labour, let us briefly explore the way in which the new governance has undermined Diceyan ideas such as those about parliamentary sovereignty and a subordinate judiciary.
Defining juridification
The word "juridification" is used in several different ways to capture various changes that make law a more powerful or prevalent force in state and society. Law and judges are, it seems, playing more prominent parts in our collective decision-making and so in structuring social life.
The popularity of the notion of juridification owes much to Jurgen Habermas. For Habermas, and 11 many others, juridification has a narrow meaning. 13 It refers to the tendency of modern states to deploy the law to transform civil society and private life. The state transforms private life into a public matter especially through its extension of the welfare state. However, while this narrow notion of juridification draws attention to some changes in regulatory laws, it risks occluding other ways in which law is increasingly penetrating politics and society. In Britain, for example, the Thatcher governments of the 1980s used legal regulations less to expand welfare than to regulate local government in an attempt to roll-back the state. 14 Thatcherism thus provides an example of juridification occurring alongside an attempt to reduce the role of the state in the market, civil society, and private life.
A broader concept of juridification might refer to all the ways in which an expanded role for law narrows the scope for democratic processes within civil society or within governmental institutions themselves. Juridification thus captures not only the expanding range of laws but also the growing reliance on judges and courts to interpret and apply laws. These processes constrain the space for democratic decisions. Even when a representative institution creates a rule on an issue and hands the application of that rule to the courts, it thereby constrains the space for any future democratic decisions on that issue. When the application of the rule is given over to the courts, then citizens (and legislators and public officials) have an incentive to try to get their way on that issue by employing a lawyer rather than by engaging in democratic politics. This broader concept of juridification would cover the ways in which law continues to become more powerful even as neoliberal governments and their successors seek to roll-back or reform the welfare state.
Lars Blichner and Anders Molander identify five different types of juridification, emphasizing that they need not occur simultaneously. 15 First, "constitutive juridification" is the process by which the norms of a political system are created or changed to improve the 12 competencies and role of the legal system. This process covers not only the expansion of the administrative and welfare state but also, as we will see, the expansion of judicial review. A second type of juridification can occur when legal regulation is expanded or increasingly differentiated. Third, juridification takes place when social actors, in and outside of government, increasingly refer to the law to resolve conflicts. A fourth type of juridification is identified with the judges and the courts playing an increasingly prominent role in lawmaking. In Britain, and the EU more generally, the European Court has facilitated the courts expansion into lawmaking.
Yet, as we will see, this type of juridification sometimes might be less a result of the judiciary grabbing for more power than of the government or citizens forcing the judiciary to take on a greater role. Finally, a fifth type of juridification is a vague process in which people increasingly come to define themselves and others in legal terms, such as what it means to be an EU citizen.
Understanding juridification
Once we expand our concept of juridification to cover the diverse processes identified by
Blichner and Molander, we need to relate it not only to the welfare state but, arguably more importantly, to the rise of marketisation, contracting-out, networks, joined-up governance, and other related developments. How are we to understand and explain juridification so conceived?
How are we to explain the increasing irrelevance of Dicey?
We might begin by relating juridification to the new governance. To relate juridifcation to more general changes in governance and the state is neither particularly controversial nor particularly original. Lars Trägardh and Michael Carpini write, "the juridification of politics to a considerable extent must be understood in empirical, rather than normative terms; that is, as one expression of the broad secular trend that is currently challenging the political order that we call globalisation and the rise of a modern individualism, concluding that a globalised market society is hollowing out the state from above and below.
Trägardh and Carpini offer little concrete discussion of the ways in which the new governance leads to juridification. We can get a sense of some of the processes involved, however, if we return to the attempts of the Thatcher governments to regulate local government. 17 As was mentioned above, central government used law to constrain local government as part of its attempt to promote marketisation, the new public management, and other aspects of the new governance. In addition, when central government attacked established bureaucratic norms and procedures, it created a climate of uncertainly such that political actors, including central and local governments, turned to the courts to determine their rights and duties.
More generally, the new governance has led to juridification through the following general processes:
• The new theories of governance drew attention to the ways in which the law played a more extensive role than was suggested by previous theories including those of Dicey.
• The new worlds of governance, including the rise of transnational institutions and contracting-out, gave the law a more extensive role than it previously had.
• Politicians, judges, and citizens have been inspired by the new theories to respond to the new worlds in ways that have given the law a yet more extensive role.
Let us illustrate each of these processes with examples from British politics prior to New Labour coming to power in 1997. Various new theories suggested that the courts always had played an active role in British politics. While early twentieth century constitutional lawyers focused on topics inherited from Dicey, paying little attention to administrative law, social scientists began to pay more and more attention to public administration and the policy process. Once legal scholars too began to take note of the administrative state, Diceyan opposition to a distinct administrative law seemed implausible, as did the idea that the judiciary remained above politics. 19 Among the roles that the judiciary has long played in British politics are, first, judicial review based on case law, and, second, administrative regulation by ombudsmen, tribunals, and inquiries.
In so far as Diceyan inspired constitutional lawyers paid attention to administrative law, they concentrated on the case law of judicial review by the courts. proceeded with a deportation despite having assured the court that it would not do so, the courts even decided that Ministers could be in contempt of court. 20 The influence of Dicey meant that constitutional lawyers were slow to recognise the extent to which law intervened in politics not only by judicial review but also by ombudsmen, tribunals, and inquiries. 21 It is true that some of the tribunals and inquiries that judges lead are fairly uncontentious investigations into national disasters such as that into the collapse of crowd barriers at Hillsborough football stadium. Even these inquiries can have direct policy and legal implications, however, such as the requirement that certain stadiums be seating only. What is more, judges also head tribunals and lead investigations that concern the actions of government ministers, parliamentarians, civil servants, and street-level bureaucrats. Macmillan initiated such an inquiry into the Profumo affair. In the Thatcher years, Lord Justice Scarman examined the causes of race riots in Brixton, London.
New worlds of governance
New worlds of governance have given the law a more extensive role than it had previously. In mentioning new worlds of governance, I do not want to suggest that they arose as part of an inexorable process of functionalisation, rationalisation, or modernisation independent of the theories of policy actors. To the contrary, the new worlds of governance can be seen as products of the new theories of governance: neoclassical economics and rational choice theory inspired contracting-out and other neoliberal reforms, and institutionalist theories of networks are now inspiring attempts to promote partnerships and joined-up government. 22 In mentioning new worlds of governance, I want to suggest only that new policies, such as contracting-out, and new institutions, such as the EU, extended the role of law in political decision-making.
Neoliberal reforms of the public sector often transformed administrative relations into legal ones. 23 For example, contracting-out replaced the hierarchic relationships of a bureaucracy with a contractual one between purchaser and provider. The rise of such legal relations meant that the courts had to play a greater role in defining where formal powers and liabilities lay in a range of public services.
A far more dramatic impact came about as a result of Britain joining the EU. 24 Legal appeals then could be made to two European bodies. These are the European Court of Justice way that seemed contrary to EU law. When a Spanish company, Factortame, appealed, the British courts deferred the issue to the ECJ while saying that they could not strike down an Act of Parliament. The ECJ declared that the House of Lords did have the authority to overturn parliamentary legislation so as to uphold EC law. In 1991, the British courts decided the case by declaring that when domestic and EU law appeared to conflict, the courts should assume that Parliament intended to give precedence to EU law. 25 Hence the courts have come to adjudicate differences between national and supranational legislation.
Responding to governance
Politicians, judges, and citizens have been inspired by the new theories to respond to the new worlds in ways that have given the law a yet more extensive role. Indeed, at a very general level, an increased awareness of the role of law has prompted many political actors to intensify their practices of self-scrutiny. For example, the growth of a regime of regulation, and with it a consciousness of regulations, has prompted many local governments and executive agencies to see and manage themselves in increasingly legal terms. Legal consciousness and legal relations have thus become more prominent in all kinds of everyday practices of governance.
Citizens have forced the courts to take on a more active role. There are parallels here between developments in Britain and the US. According to some legal scholars, the US has witnessed the rise of a culture of "adversarial legalism": as popular trust in politicians has declined so individuals and interest groups have turned to the courts and litigation to check government action and resolve disputes. 26 To this well-known story, I would add only the suggestion that the decline of popular trust in politicians owes something to the spread of a loose set of beliefs about the self-interested nature of political action (beliefs not unlike the informing assumptions of neoclassical economics and rational choice theory). 27 Adversarial legalism thus starts to appear as a broad phenomena inspired by the spread of concepts of economic rationality and the theories of governance to which these have given rise.
While citizens have forced a more extensive role on the courts, judges have actively grabbed for a greater role. Sometimes they are inspired by the rise of new patterns of global governance: high court justices from different countries form an increasingly distinctive and selfconscious network, drawing on one another's decisions in a way that gives international norms authority over domestic governments. 28 Sometimes they are inspired by a liberal institutionalism in which the judiciary stands as an independent branch of government defending the rights and welfare of individuals, and perhaps the public interest. 29 The having to take "the long road to Strasbourg". They also suggested that the HRA would mean domestic courts would screen cases before they went to Strasburg, thereby reducing the long and embarrassing list of cases in which the ECJ had ruled against the British government.
Government spokespeople also appealed at times to trust and accountability. They argued that the HRA would increase the level of trust in government by giving citizens the security of knowing that the courts would prevent the state misusing its power. 
Conclusion
Juridification is intimately linked to the new governance. New theories of governance increased awareness of the role courts have always played. New worlds of governance made judges and courts more significant. Finally, politicians, judges, and citizens responded to the new governance by giving a greater role to law and the courts. New Labour's judicial reforms are an example of this latter active promotion of juridification.
To recognise the extent to which juridification has been actively promoted as a response to the new governance is to challenge its aura of inexorability. When social scientists link juridification to globalisation and the new governance, they often give it an aura of historical inevitability. Earlier I evoked Trägardh and Carpini favourably as having recognised the links 27 between juridification and the wider processes that were eroding national democracy and creating new forms of governance. Now I would point out in a more critical vein that they describe these processes as if there were no alternative. They write, "from this point of view, the juridification of politics is a more of less unavoidable fact of modern political life." 35 Yet, to associate juridification with the new governance is to suggest it is unavoidable only if one assumes, first, that the new governance is unavoidable, and, second, that the association between them is necessary rather than contingent. Both these assumptions are questionable. We can Gordon Brown began his campaign to become leader of the Labour Party with a speech that included hints of further constitutional and judicial reforms. 36 After Brown became Prime
Minister, his government issued a green paper, with the significant title The Governance of Britain, which proposed a distinct British Bill of Rights and Duties. 37 The green paper called for preliminary hearings and public consultations on such a Bill to begin later in 2007. Even if
Brown lost the next general election, the Liberals are even more committed to such proposals, and the Conservatives now accept some such idea. David Cameron, the current leader of the Conservative Party, supports the repeal of the Human Rights Act, but, unlike his predecessors, he proposes replacing it with an alternative bill of rights for Britain. It would take a dramatic change for radical democracy and deliberative policy-making to emerge from the shadow of codified rights and alleged expertise.
